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1. Introduction
The recent global financial and economic crisis and the
consequent scaling up of bankruptcy indicators call for further
reflection on the survival patterns of firms during a crisis period.
The literature on firm survival has shown the detrimental impact
of macroeconomic instability upon firms’ survival and their
dynamics (e.g., Audretsch & Acs, 1994; Bhattacharjee, Higson,
Holly, & Kattuman, 2009; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Varum &
Rocha, 2011, 2012). However, particular groups of firms may be
better able to surpass the difficulties of a crisis. In this regard, one
may ask if foreign firms exit with less or greater likelihood than
their domestic counterparts, and how does this likelihood of
exiting vary in economic downturns. This issue has been relatively
neglected in the literature, albeit the weight of foreign firms on
many host economies.
There is a rich stream of literature investigating the survival of
firms in foreign markets in comparison with domestic firms
(Bernard & Sjo¨holm, 2003; Go¨rg & Strobl, 2003a, 2003b; Kronborg
& Thomsen, 2009; Li & Guisinger, 1991; Mata & Portugal, 2002).
The overwhelming conclusion is that after controlling for
characteristics that make foreign firms different than domestic
ones, foreign firms tend to exit with greater likelihood. The most
common explanations to why foreign firms exit more often than
domestic ones rest upon the idea that in host economies foreign
firms face certain disadvantages vis-a`-vis their domestic counter-
parts, thus suffering from a ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995).
Along this line of thought, the theory of multinational enterprises
has developed upon the argument that firms operating in foreign
markets need to have some type of ownership advantages to
compensate for these increased costs of doing business abroad
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008). From another line of argumentation,
multinationals are by nature more footloose than domestic firms,
and therefore are more likely to exit (Mata & Freitas, 2012).
Both lines of argument support the view that foreign firms may
be more likely to exit markets. However, they lead to different
expectations with respect to the likelihood of exit during economic
downturns. The footloose argument implies that foreign firms
should be even more likely to exit during downturns. When
changes in the host economy make that economy less attractive,
relocation is seen more favorably by foreign firms than by domestic
ones, which are more attached to a particular location. Alterna-
tively, the liability of foreignness argument implies that the exit
rates of foreign and domestic firms should converge during
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downturns because foreign firms hold some sort of ownership
advantages over domestic ones. Foreign multinationals may have
better conditions to face the crises owing to their multinationality
advantages or they may resist more due to the sunk costs
associated with their investment (Chung, Lu, & Beamish, 2008;
Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2004; Ghosal, 2010).
Studies about the importance of foreign ownership during
crises are relatively scarce, the notable exceptions being the
studies by A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009), Lee and Makhija (2009) and
Varum and Rocha (2011). Hence, in this paper we use
longitudinal firm-level data for a large time span to assess, first,
whether foreign ownership contributes to differentiating the
incidence of firm exit during crises, controlling for other
determinants that may affect the exit risk of firms. We use
discrete time hazard models that account for firm-level unob-
served heterogeneity to answer our research questions. In
addition, we analyze whether the foreign ownership effect
differs between two crises, which occurred in the same economy,
in different periods of time and with different characteristics. To
our knowledge the paper is unique in these respects. We analyze
manufacturing firms created in Portugal in the period 1988–2005
by following their paths during the whole period and the
economic slowdowns of early 1990s and 2000s. Portugal in
particular is an interesting case as the economy experienced
these significant slowdowns which provide us with ‘a natural
experiment to identify directly the ‘‘footloose nature’’ of multi-
nationals’ (A´lvarez & Go¨rg, 2009).
Results from past lessons may be of value in understanding
more modern recessions, such as the one from which the world
economy is currently recovering. For the Portuguese case we add to
the previous important contributions of Mata and Portugal (2002,
2004), by enlarging the time span of their study and focusing on the
potential effect of foreign ownership during (different) downturn
periods. Compared to Varum and Rocha (2011), who examined the
link between foreign ownership, firm employment and turnover
growth and crises, the present study investigates firms’ dynamics
in terms of firm survival, using discrete time duration models. The
analysis also adds to Varum and Rocha (2012) by exploring the
foreignness effect upon firm survival under crises, differentiating
between two distinct crisis contexts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on foreign ownership–firm survival relationship. Most of
this literature does not focus on the effects during downturns, but
allows for understanding why we may expect differences between
foreign and domestic firms’ exits patterns. Section 3 relates to
methodological issues, where the data and econometric proce-
dures are outlined. Section 4 presents some descriptive statistics
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Macroeconomic conditions, foreign ownership, firm survival
and exit
The overall state of the economy has long been indicated as an
important force driving firms out of business (Geroski et al., 2010).
Current macroeconomic environment affects not only market
conditions but also market expectations about the future, leading
firms to exit if an unfavorable environment is predictable. Despite
the fact that some studies prove that exit is not responsive to the
cycle (e.g. Boeri & Bellman, 1995; Ilmakunnas & Topi, 1999), many
others found that firm exit is countercyclical and that there is a
detrimental impact of macroeconomic instability upon firms’
survival and their dynamics (Audretsch & Acs, 1994; Bhattacharjee
et al., 2009; Box, 2008; Varum & Rocha, 2012). Downturn periods
are expected to increase firms’ hazards, though eventually this
effect may be different between firms. Hence, it is important to
investigate which firm-level conditions contribute to explain why
firms resist differently during economic slowdowns.
Many studies have investigated the survival of firms in foreign
markets. The empirical results on this matter are not unanimous
(see Table 1). The overwhelming conclusion is that when
controlling for a number of variables along which foreign firms
differentiate from domestic ones, the former often exhibit higher
exit rates. This fact may be due to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer
& Mosakowski, 1997) or to the footloose nature of multinationals.
However, it remains overlooked whether under a crisis’
environment foreign firms are affected or react differently from
domestic firms and, if that is the case, whether or not their
advantages compensate for the disadvantages of doing business
abroad, possibly making them weather the crisis in a better way (or
not). From the literature, we may explore arguments for a stabilizer
or otherwise role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) during
economic downturns.
2.1. Footloose multinationals and economic downturns
Compared to their domestic counterparts, it may be easier for
foreign firms to transfer production facilities internationally
(Flamm, 1984; Lee & Makhija, 2009), to cut operational costs
(Gao & Eshaghoff, 2004) and, in the extreme, to exit the local
economy. If multinationals are indeed more ‘‘footloose’’, they may
be expected to be more likely to leave the country, especially
during that period when it is hit by a negative shock. Actually, and
relying on the way of thinking about foreign direct investment
(FDI) enriched by real option theory (Campa, 1993; Li & Rugman,
2007), foreign firms may decide to switch operations quickly
between locations in response to changing costs differentials,
market opportunities and host country uncertainty, particularly
Table 1
Empirical evidence on the foreign ownership–firm survival link.a
(A) Positive relationship (B) Negative relationship
Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) – Indonesia [1975–1985] Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) – 47 countries [1974–1993]
Li and Guisinger (1991) – USA [1978–1988] Go¨rg and Strobl (2003a, 2003b) – Ireland [1973–1996]
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) – USA [1976–1986] Bernard and Sjo¨holm (2003) – Indonesia [1975–1989]
Mata and Portugal (2004) – Portugal [1983–1989] Kimura and Kiyota (2006) – Japan [1994–2000]
Narjoko and Hill (2007) – Indonesia [1993–2000] Bernard and Jensen (2007) – USA [1987–1997]
Bridges and Guariglia (2008) – UK [1997–2002] Van Beveren (2007) – Belgium [1996–2001]
Girma and Gong (2008) – China [1999–2005] Fertala (2008) – Germany [1997–2004]
Kronborg and Thomsen (2009) – Denmark [1895–2005] A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009) – Chile [1990–2000]
Holmes, Hunt, and Stone (2010) – UK [1973–2001] Bandick and Go¨rg (2010) – Sweden [1993–2002]
(C) Neutral relationship
Mata and Portugal (2002) – Portugal [1983–1989] Kimura and Kiyota (2007) – Japan [1994–1998]
O¨zler and Taymaz (2004) – Turkey [1983–1996] Taymaz and O¨zler (2007) – Turkey [1983–2001]
a Studies are presented in a chronological order (Reference – Country [Time Period]).
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when the ‘‘growth-or-switch options’’ created when investing
abroad overlap or duplicate each other (Belderbos & Zou, 2009).
Unless sunk costs and the irreversibility of investment are
considerable – which may, in opposition, create some ‘‘hysteresis’’
and inertia in foreign firms’ strategic response to macroeconomic
changes – multinational firms tend to be more footloose than their
domestic counterparts when facing environmental uncertainty,
especially when their real investment options are redundant,
either at the host-country level or at the MNE portfolio level
(Belderbos & Zou, 2007, 2009; Ghosal, 2010; Lehmann, 2002).
Though empirical analyses on MNEs’ responses to macroeco-
nomic changes are still scant, some results already emerged. Using
plant-level data for manufacturing industries in Chile, A´lvarez and
Go¨rg (2009) examined the determinants of exit probabilities of
plants in the period 1995–2000 covering a major slowdown in the
late 1990s, paying particular attention to the role of the nationality
of the plant. They found robust evidence that foreign plants were
more likely to exit only for the late 1990s, when the Chilean
economy was in recession. They argue that this evidence is
consistent with the argument that multinationals are more likely
to readjust their investment decisions and exit if the economy is hit
by a negative shock. Hence, following this line of argumentation,
we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The probability of exit of foreign-owned firms
increases even further to those of domestic firms during economic
downturns.
2.2. Liability of foreignness and ownership advantages over economic
downturns
The liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), or the extra costs
foreign firms face vis-a`-vis their domestic counterparts in host
economies, has been at the center of the literature that found
foreign firms to exit more than domestic ones with similar
characteristics (Bernard & Sjo¨holm, 2003; Go¨rg & Strobl, 2003a,
2003b; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Even though, foreign
enterprises are said to possess firm-specific advantages – of the
type described in the pioneering work of Hymer (1976) – that
compensate for the liability of foreignness, which make them able
to surpass and to outperform their domestic counterparts in the
host economy (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). These advantages may
become more valuable during economic downturns in the host
economy.
Chung et al.’s (2008) study of a sample of Japanese subsidiaries
from 1994 to 1999 indicates that the enhanced flexibility
associated with intra- and inter-firm organizational linkages is
more likely to increase the performance of subsidiaries operating
in a crisis rather than in economically stable environments.
Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2005), in turn, investigated whether
foreign ownership affected investment in Indonesia in 1997
following the Asian financial crisis. Despite they could not reject
somewhat higher excess mortality rates among foreign-owned
plants, they concluded that the post-crisis excess mortality of
foreign firms was lower than the differences found in the pre-crisis.
They argued that this convergence was due to the ‘multination-
ality’ advantage of foreign firms. Firms with foreign ownership, in
particular those more oriented toward export markets, could
access credit through their parent company and thus insure
themselves against liquidity constraints. Accordingly, foreign
subsidiaries in MNE networks may survive longer in a crisis
owing to their better access to resources and greater ability to use
internal capital markets when faced with financial constraints,
being able to access overseas credit through their parent
companies, which allows them to expand their economic
activity even in turbulent periods (e.g., Desai et al., 2004). The
argumentation above predicts that during economic downturns,
the incidence of the exit of foreign firms, which in normal periods
tends to be higher, may actually get closer to that of domestic
firms. Hence, we derive the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The probability of exit of foreign owned firms
becomes closer to that of domestic firms during economic down-
turns.
In what follows we conduct the empirical analysis and derive
our conclusions of the aforementioned hypotheses.
3. Data and methodological issues
3.1. Data
In this study, we use data from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth
QP), a matched employer–employee administrative dataset from
the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. QP is an annual
mandatory employment survey that all firms in the private sector
employing at least one wage earner are legally obliged to fill in.
Requested data cover the establishment (location, employment
and economic activity), the firm (location, employment, sales,
economic activity, ownership, number of establishments and legal
setting) and each of its workers (gender, age, education,
qualifications, occupational category, employment status, earn-
ings, tenure and hours of work). All firms, establishments and
workers entering QP dataset have a unique identification number,
so we can track firms/establishments and workers over time and
match workers with their respective employers. This makes QP a
suitable dataset to study firm survival and exit.
We have access to the original data for the period 1985–2007.
By working directly with raw data files at the firm-level, it was
possible to compute entry and exit measures by ourselves. Firm’s
entry year corresponds to the first year the firm appears in the
dataset. Therefore, we can only identify entries from 1986
onwards, as data for 1985 was only used to check the presence
of firms in the dataset. The time of exit, in turn, was determined by
the last year the firm was registered in QP. However, as temporary
exits of one year may occur (for instance, due to a firm’s delay in
delivering the survey in a particular year), we have required an
absence of the firm from QP for at least two consecutive years to
confirm that the firm has definitely exited and closed operations.
Accordingly, we can identify exits only until 2005, as data for 2006
and 2007 are only used to check the records of the firm in the two
subsequent years.
Firm exit is defined as the event of closing a firm. Despite the
comprehensiveness of the QP database, it has also some limita-
tions, which prevented us from distinguishing between different
exit modes – namely between voluntary exit and bankruptcy – or
even from identifying cases in which a firm is absorbed or taken
over by another firm. The same problems were already faced by
previous empirical works for Portugal (e.g. Geroski et al., 2010;
Mata & Portugal, 2002, 2004) using QP data. As a result, our
analysis is based on the timing at which a firm ceases to do
business, disappearing from QP records. Regarding possible cases
of mergers, in which an independent legal unit might disappear
without the corresponding disappearance of the firm, there is no
published data on mergers for Portugal. However, Geroski et al.
(2010) ensure that less than 1% of the total number of liquidations
in Portugal is due to mergers or acquisitions, which suggests that
our limitations in identifying exits due to mergers have no
significant impact on our results.
The analysis is performed for firms operating in Manufacturing
Industry during the period 1988–2005. We have to restrict the
period to 1988–2005 because we only have data on the industry’s
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exports and imports (which are needed to compute industry’s
openness to trade, to be controlled in our estimations) from 1988
onwards (see Appendix A.I). We focus on the 1988 and later
cohorts, following each firm since the year of entry until its last
record in the database, which may correspond to the moment of
exit or, alternatively, to the last year we have information about
the firm. If the firm has not experienced the exit during the whole
period, it is identified as a right-censored case, corresponding to
firms whose entry year is known but which are still active when
the period under study ends (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008;
Singer & Willett, 1993).
3.2. Empirical strategy and variables
We rely on duration models, which provide a dynamic
framework that addresses the inability of static binary choice
models to take into account right-censoring issues. As data on firms’
duration comes from an annual survey, our measured durations are
grouped into yearly time intervals, which are properly accommo-
dated by discrete time duration models (Singer & Willett, 1993). We
thus proceed by dividing the time axis (1988–2005) into 18
intervals, corresponding to our 18 measured durations.
Formally, we observe firm i’s spell from period j = 1 (corre-
sponding to the year of entry) through to the end of the jth period,
at which point i’s spell is either complete ci = 1 or right-censored
ci = 0 (flow sample). To estimate the discrete interval hazard rate –
that is, the probability of exiting at discrete time tj, j = 1, 2, . . .,
conditional upon having survived until then – can be defined as:
hi j ¼ PrðTi ¼ jjTi  jÞ ¼ FðgðtÞ þ X0iðtÞb þ eiÞ; (1)
where hij is the probability of firm i remaining active for exactly j
years; g(t) describes the pattern of duration dependence (the
baseline hazard); X0iðtÞ is a vector of firm and industry-level
variables which, from the literature, and similarly to Varum and
Rocha (2012), are expected to impact on firm survival (see
Appendix A.I for details on these variables); b is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated; ei is a disturbance term that
includes the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (the firm-
specific effect) and that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
observable firm and industry characteristics X0iðtÞ; and finally F()
denotes the complementary log-logistic distribution function.
Following prior studies on firm survival using QP (Mata &
Portugal, 2002; Varum & Rocha, 2012), we do not impose any
functional form for g(t); we instead estimate a piecewise constant
hazard model, where exit rates are assumed to be constant within
each interval (year) but different between intervals (years). Thus,
in order to estimate the full set of g’s, we have added an indicator
variable per duration time t to the model. This flexible modeling
has been recognized to be preferred in order to avoid serious
misspecifications. Moreover, such hazard formulation with a
flexible baseline hazard function makes an attractive model with
which to combine a specific heterogeneity assumption (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2005: 620). Accordingly, following usual conventions (e.g.,
Hougaard, 1995; Jenkins, 2005), we assume an Inverse Gaussian
distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity term, so that ei is
normally distributed with zero mean and unitary variance.
Summing up, the discrete time hazard function in (1), to be
estimated under a complementary log-logistic model with Inverse
Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity, may be rewritten as follows:
hi j ¼ 1  expfexp½gðtÞ þ X0iðtÞb þ logðeiÞg: (2)
The variable Foreign Ownership – one of the core variables included
in the vector X0iðtÞ – will allow us to assess the effect of foreign
capital participation in firms’ exit patterns. As our main goal is to
assess whether foreign-owned firms have different failure rates
than domestic firms during downturns, and if that effect differs
depending on the type of crises, we focus our attention on an
interaction term between Foreign Ownership and two indicator
variables for the periods of economic downturn (For. Own*-
Downturni, with i = 1991–1994, 2001–2003).
Regarding other firm and industry-level variables that are
believed to affect firm survival, we follow the existent empirical
literature on firm survival determinants (see, for instance, Manjo´n-
Antolı´n and Arauzo-Carod (2008) for a survey). At the firm-level,
we control for firm age (see Jovanovic, 1982; Stinchcombe, 1965,
among others), firm size (measured by the log number of
employees) (e.g., Varum & Rocha, 2012), human capital (proxied
by the share of college workers) (e.g., Acs & Armington, 2009;
Bates, 1990), firm performance (sales per worker, in logs) (e.g.,
Bandick, 2010; Carreira & Teixeira, 2011) and location in urban
centers (e.g., Fotopoulos & Louri, 2000). The effects of firm age and
size are allowed to be non-linear in line with most of the literature,
as these variables may exert an increasing (decreasing) effect on
firm exit risks up to some point of firm age or size, while exerting a
decreasing (increasing) effect thereafter.
Concerning the industry environment, we will control for
potential differences in the industry context. We will consider the
minimum efficient scale – calculated as the median of 2-digit
industry’s employment – as one of the reasons why so many firms
fail is that their entry size is smaller than the minimum scale
required to be efficient (Audretsch, 1995). By including industry
openness (measured by the ratio of 2-digit industry’s (export-
s + imports) to industry’s gross value added), we try to take the
industry’s exposure to international conditions into account. We
will control for market concentration through the Herfindahl–
Hirschman (HH) Index, which may either raise the risk of failure
through greater competition intensity or decrease the exit rates by
offering the incumbents enough power to retaliate against
entrants. Industry growth (in terms of employment) will also be
controlled for, as average profits are affected by growth rates of
industries, so industries growing quickly may exert positive
impacts upon survival. Entry rates may also be associated with
firm survival, as firms tend to enter the industries where higher
profits are expected. Agglomeration economies at the industry and
regional-levels, as well as foreign presence in the industry, will also
be taken into account, as they are commonly controlled for in
comparative studies of domestic and foreign firms (see Table A.I for
additional details on the computation of these variables).
Regarding foreign presence, this variable is commonly introduced
in firm survival studies, not only to try to capture horizontal
spillovers from multinationals to other firms in the industry
(A´lvarez & Go¨rg, 2009), but also in order to account for some
unobserved characteristics of the industries, such as advertising
and technological intensity (Mata & Portugal, 2002), which may be
related to the previous presence of foreign firms in the market.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and unconditional survival analysis
4.1.1. Survival and hazard rates
Over the time period under scrutiny, it was possible to identify
two downturn periods in the Portuguese economy: the early 1990s
(1991–1994) and the early 2000s (2001–2003) (Bank of Portugal,
2009). Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate, respectively, the evolution of real
GDP growth rates and unemployment rates over the period under
study, both for Portugal and for the Euro area. In these periods, the
common stylized facts for a downturn period were observed – both
periods were characterized by declines in GDP growth rates, in
private consumption and investment and by a rise in unemploy-
ment. However, the early 2000s recession was different from that
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occurred in 1993/1994, when foreign demand for goods fell 3.2%,
which culminated into a period of several years in which there was
a gradual slowing of this variable. According to the Bank of Portugal
(2004), the reduction of the product in 2003 was not associated
with a fall in exports of goods and services. Hence, for the purpose
of our analysis we consider the second crisis to be predominantly
domestic driven.
After identifying entry and exits of firms in Manufacturing, we
obtained a discrete time panel data set composed by 87,027 firms
‘‘born’’ during the period 1988–2005. From these, 55,622 exits
were identified. As a first step of our survival analysis, we have
estimated the survivor function of firms, without controlling for
any observed and unobserved differences between them. Using
Kaplan–Meier (KM) estimator (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980), the
unconditional probability of a firm surviving beyond time t is
computed as follows:
Sˆðt jÞ ¼
Yt
j¼t0
1  dj
n j
 
; (3)
where dj is the number of exits in each time interval and nj is the
number of firms at risk of exit. Precise estimations for the survivor
and hazard functions for all firms are presented in Table 2.
Only 15.57% of the firms remained active after 18 years.
The results also confirm the high exit rate of young firms. Indeed,
the risk of exit tends to be higher during the first five years of
activity – which corresponds to the estimated median survival
time – being slightly lower thereafter. In particular, data show that
more than 50% of firms ceased their operations during the first five
years and almost 70% of firms exited before completing a decade of
activity.
Fig. 3 depicts the KM survivor functions for different categories
of firms, stratified according to their foreign ownership status
(Domestic Firm if less than 10% of the capital is held by foreigners,
Minority Foreign Firm (FF) if the share of foreign capital is between
10% and 49%, Majority FF if this share is between 50% and 99% and,
finally, Wholly-Owned FF for the cases in which 100% of the capital
is foreign). Table 3 compares the unconditional survival rates
between small and large firms within the samples of foreign and
domestic firms. Firms are stratified into small and medium-sized
or large-sized firms through an indicator variable Small that
assumes the value 1 if the firm is a SME (Small–Medium
Enterprise). This classification is made according to the European
definition of SMEs (European Commission, 2005).
Unconditionally, foreign-owned firms survive longer than their
domestic counterparts and, moreover, wholly foreign-owned firms
seem to have the highest survival rates. Median survival time is
lower for domestic firms (about four to five years against 10–12
years for foreign firms). The Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests confirm
that differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Taking
in consideration firm size, the differences in survival chances seem
not to be relevant among foreign firms. Conversely, large domestic
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Fig. 1. Annual growth rate of real GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
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Table 2
Survival and hazard rates – all firms in Portuguese manufacturing industry, 1988–2005.
Time interval Nr. firms at risk Nr. failures Net Losta Survival Std. error Hazard Std. error Cumulative failure
[1–2[ 87,027 16,890 3350 0.8059 0.0013 0.1941 0.0015 0.1941
[2–3[ 66,787 9631 2820 0.6897 0.0016 0.1442 0.0015 0.3103
[3–4[ 54,336 7058 3145 0.6001 0.0017 0.1299 0.0015 0.3999
[4–5[ 44,133 5328 3381 0.5277 0.0018 0.1207 0.0017 0.4723
[5–6[ 35,424 3953 3466 0.4688 0.0018 0.1116 0.0018 0.5312
[6–7[ 28,005 2872 1975 0.4207 0.0018 0.1026 0.0019 0.5793
[7–8[ 23,158 2277 1544 0.3793 0.0018 0.0983 0.0021 0.6207
[8–9[ 19,337 1704 1335 0.3459 0.0018 0.0881 0.0021 0.6541
[9–10[ 16,298 1387 1290 0.3165 0.0019 0.0851 0.0023 0.6835
[10–11[ 13,621 1125 1060 0.2903 0.0019 0.0826 0.0025 0.7097
[11–12[ 11,436 929 1273 0.2668 0.0019 0.0812 0.0027 0.7332
[12–13[ 9234 787 1491 0.2440 0.0019 0.0852 0.0030 0.7560
[13–14[ 6956 547 896 0.2248 0.0019 0.0786 0.0034 0.7752
[14–15[ 5513 447 854 0.2066 0.0019 0.0811 0.0038 0.7934
[15–16[ 4212 303 950 0.1917 0.0020 0.0719 0.0041 0.8083
[16–17[ 2959 181 855 0.1800 0.0020 0.0612 0.0045 0.8200
[17–18[ 1923 150 914 0.1660 0.0022 0.0780 0.0064 0.8340
[18–19[ 859 53 806 0.1557 0.0025 0.0617 0.0085 0.8443
a ‘‘Net Lost’’ gives the number of censored cases, and hence the cases no longer entering the risk set.
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firms seem to have substantially better chances of survival. In
opposition, small domestic firms are more exposed to risk of exit
during their infancy, with almost 40% of these firms closing down
operations before the third year of activity, and less than 50%
reaching the fifth year.
4.1.2. Describing foreign and domestic firms
Table 4 provides a brief comparison between domestic and
foreign firms, presenting the mean values of the main independent
variables included in our estimations. Overall, we observe that
firms with foreign participation are larger, more intensive in
human capital, with higher levels of operational performance,
being also more concentrated in urban centers, when compared to
domestic firms.
Regarding the industries entered, our results confirm expected
differences between foreign and domestic entrants. Foreign
entrants prefer industries where concentration is higher, where
minimum efficient scale is larger, with stronger foreign presence
and greater openness to external trade. Regarding the industry
growth rate, the entry rates in the industry and the agglomeration
in the region where firms are located, the differences were not so
evident. However, the overall results suggest that, due to their
intrinsic advantages, foreign entrants are usually in a better
position to overcome the obstacles posed by entry barriers. A
correlation matrix for the main variables included in the
estimations can be found in Appendix A.II.
4.2. Estimation results
4.2.1. The foreign ownership effect
Table 5 provides our first results on the effect of foreign
ownership measured by the share of firm capital held by foreign
investors. Table A.III presents a summary of the results obtained
Log-Rank  Test χ2(3) = 228.53** *  Wilcoxon Test χ2(3) = 207.41***        
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Fig. 3. K–M survivor function, by foreign ownership.
Table 3
Survival rates for domestic and foreign SMEs and LEs (Portugal, 1988–2005).
Survival time Domestic Firms Minority FF Majority FF Wholly-Owned FF
SMEs LEs SMEs LEs SMEs LEs SMEs LEs
1 0.8059 0.7957 0.9459 1.0000 0.9034 1.0000 0.9127 0.8966
3 0.6001 0.7162 0.8188 0.7500 0.7359 0.9167 0.7927 0.7890
5 0.4686 0.6479 0.7294 0.7500 0.6371 0.8148 0.6950 0.6216
7 0.3790 0.5822 0.6202 0.7500 0.5774 0.6984 0.6245 0.6216
9 0.3160 0.5433 0.5770 0.7500 0.5230 0.6984 0.5498 0.4895
11 0.2661 0.4939 0.5339 0.7500 0.4794 0.5587 0.4980 0.4196
13 0.2240 0.4939 0.4905 . 0.4349 0.5587 0.4481 0.4196
15 0.1909 0.4233 0.4088 . 0.3947 . 0.4252 0.4196
17 0.1652 0.4233 0.3577 . 0.3464 . 0.3753 0.4196
Log-Rank Test x2(1) 13.46*** 0.10 1.21 0.08
Wilcoxon Test x2(1) 5.93** 0.05 1.74 0.12
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises; LEs: Large Enterprises.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics (mean values) – Portugal, 1988–2005.
Domestic Firms Minority FF Majority FF Wholly-Owned FF
For. Ownership 0.0000 0.2969 0.7264 1.0000
FF_Minoritya 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
FF_Majoritya 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
FF_Wholly Owneda 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Age 4.7777 5.8604 5.5523 5.9005
Size 1.6476 3.2959 3.2432 3.6857
Firm Performance 10.1401 11.0170 11.2076 11.2745
Human Capital 0.0174 0.1054 0.0995 0.1169
Urbana 0.3680 0.4593 0.4225 0.4891
MES 6.5954 6.8858 7.0600 6.9880
HH Index 0.0024 0.0039 0.0035 0.0034
Industry Agglomeration 0.1857 0.1584 0.1763 0.1881
Regional Agglomeration 0.0743 0.0810 0.0750 0.0774
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.1088 0.1344 0.1390 0.1524
Industry Openness 1.9627 2.1910 2.2775 2.5533
Industry Growth 0.0058 0.0133 0.0116 0.0098
Entry Rate 0.0586 0.0549 0.0560 0.0551
a Indicator variable.
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from the estimation of an alternative specification of the global
model, after replacing the Foreign Ownership variable by three
indicator variables for each type of Foreign Firms (FF): Minority,
Majority or Wholly Foreign-Owned firm.
Model 1 in Table 5 shows the effect of foreign ownership on the
risk of failure, without controlling for any other firm-level or
industry-level characteristics. The results of these first estimations
are in line with those obtained from previous firm survivor
functions (Fig. 3) – unconditionally, foreign ownership decreases
firm exit risk. When we consider foreign ownership measured by
the three indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-
Owned FF, we find that, without controlling for any other
observable characteristics, all the three groups of firms have
about 29–36% lower rates of hazard than domestic firms (by taking
the exponents of the coefficients of model 1, in Table A.III). For the
period 1983–1989, Mata and Portugal (2002) had found as well
that, unconditionally, FF were 51% less prone to exit than domestic
firms. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is not directly
comparable because the periods of analysis are significantly
different.
Model 2 adds to the Foreign Ownership variable the other firm-
level characteristics. Model 3 controls for industries’ specificities.
Model 4 introduces the macroeconomic control, by adding the two
indicator variables for downturn periods. From these results, we
conclude that when controlling for other firm and industry
characteristics, and also macroeconomic conditions, the effect of
foreign ownership turns out to be positively and significantly
related to firm hazard. This means that, overall, during normal/
average conditions, foreign firms have higher exit rates than their
domestic counterparts. Results in Table A.III show that this is true
particularly for the groups of Majority FF, though the differences
are rarely statistically significant.
The inclusion of indicator variables for downturn periods in
model 4 also allows us to verify that firm exit is countercyclical,
increasing during recessive periods. Moreover, the effect of the first
downturn (1991–1994) was greater in magnitude, suggesting that
the international crisis had a larger negative effect on overall firm
survival, when compared to the second domestic shock. Taking the
exponents of both coefficients, we see that firms’ hazard increased
on average by 27% during the first downturn period and by nearly
10% in the second.
With model 5, we are able to answer our central research
question about the effect of foreign ownership during periods of
economic slowdown. It were included the terms For.Own.*Down-
turn9194 and For.Own.*Downturn0103 in the estimation of the
global model. Our results show that foreign firms suffered
comparatively higher exit risks, but only when the crisis added
also an international dimension. For the downturn of 1991–1994,
we verify that foreign ownership increases firm exit risks even
more. Results from Table A.III show that Majority FF were
particularly more exposed to failure during the first downturn
period, presenting about 57% (exp(0.4535) = 1.5738) higher hazard
rates than domestic firms. Hence, the differences that already
existed between both sets of firms were intensified during the first
downturn.
Regarding the second downturn period, the coefficient of
For.Own.*Downturn0103 is negative but not statistically significant.
The higher hazard rates observed during normal periods for foreign
firms vanished during the 2001–2003 crisis. Hence, compared to
foreign firms, domestic firms were more penalized by this second
downturn. Foreign-owned firms might have resisted slightly better
to that shock, possibly owing to their internal resources, networks
or to the capacity to explore the international market.
Hence, overall, foreign firms may act as stabilizer agents during
downturns driven by a domestic shock, if this is not accompanied
by declines in international demand. A´lvarez and Go¨rg (2009)
found foreign firms to have higher risk rates than domestic ones
during an economic downturn, but also concluded that export-
oriented multinationals were less susceptible to adverse changes
in the host economy as compared to domestic market oriented
multinationals. The former may have substituted exports for
domestic output and hence were able to fend off negative effects
and able to sustain their operations in Chile.
Therefore, the extent to which the foreignness effect matters to
explain exit may, on the one hand, depend on the type of crises. If
the crisis is more related to a domestic demand contraction, foreign
firms may indeed overcome better the downturn. Being normally
larger than domestic firms and often less reliant on the domestic
market, they may switch their sales from host countries to export
markets (Lipsey, 2001), and may be better able to face the adverse
economic conditions. On the other hand, the type of FDI may also
play a role, as horizontally- and vertically-integrated foreign firms
may react differently to a shock in the host economy. While the
former – by often replicating an identical production process
across countries and thus sharing a substituting relationship with
the parent multinational firm (e.g., Yeaple, 2003) – are expected to
be more volatile and shift production back home when facing
demand contractions in the host country, vertically-integrated
foreign firms may, instead, be more resilient during a crisis, owing
to the stabilizing role of vertical production linkages and to the
complementarities established with home country production
(Alfaro & Chen, 2012; Bogach & Noy, 2012). Unfortunately, our data
do not allow the distinction between horizontally- and vertically-
integrated foreign firms, so future research should explore
whether and how the type of FDI acts as a relevant channel
through which foreign ownership can affect firm behavior during a
crisis.
4.2.2. Firm and industry-level determinants of firm survival
Regarding the effect of other variables on firm survival, we
observe that firm-level variables, are all statistically significant.
Firm age, though weakly, exerts an inverted U-shaped effect upon
exit rates; estimated coefficients suggest that firm hazards
increase during the first eight years of firm life and start to
decrease thereafter. Firm size, in turn, has a U-shaped effect on firm
hazards; firms employing about 200 workers are estimated to have
the lowest exit risks on average, while very small and very large
firms face the greatest hazards. Firm performance is found to be
negatively related to firm hazard.
Contrary to our expectations, human capital increases the firms’
exit risk. Though surprising, such an outcome may have a
reasonable explanation and similar conclusions have already been
obtained by other studies for Portugal using QP database. Teixeira
and Vieira (2005), based on data relative to 28 NUTs and 275
Portuguese municipalities between 1990 and1999, found that
human capital intensive regions were those that, on average, had
higher rates of firm failure. According to their study, hiring top
educated workers may increase firm failure risk, at least in the
medium-long run, since these workers tend to absorb firm total
industry specific knowledge quicker than their less educated
counterparts, and therefore require higher wage levels, otherwise
they exit to rival firms, which may make the firm unprofitable. For
USA, Acs and Armington (2009) also found puzzling results on the
link between human capital and firm survival and did not discard
the hypothesis that higher shares of college degrees lead to higher
rates of failure among new firms, especially during recessions.
Actually, better educated workers may require higher wages,
which leads to increasing costs for firms. More recently, Campbell,
Ganco, Franco, and Agarwal (2012) stress that employees with
higher earnings (which are positively related with their education)
are less likely to leave the firm relative to employees with lower
earnings, but if they leave, they are more likely to create a new
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venture than join another firm, which may be harmful for the
source firm.
Regardingtheinfluenceof location,beinglocatedinurbancenters
is found to increase the risk of failure, so despite the wealth of diverse
resources often found in urban areas, the intensity of competition or
diseconomies of agglomeration lowers the survival prospects of
firms. With respect to the effect of industry variables, higher entry
rates and higher openness to trade increase the risk of exit. Higher
minimumefficientscaleoftheindustryinsteadreducesfirmhazards.
The larger the industry growth, the lower are the estimated hazard
risks for firms. Firms operating in more agglomerated regions (in
terms of employment) face higher exit risks. The effect arising from
foreign presence is not statistically significant.
However, we must be aware that some of these variables may
be endogeneous, being jointly determined with firm hazard rates
and correlated with the error term. According to prior literature,
firm size and firm performance are the main regressors potentially
suffering from endogeneity problems (see, for instance, Blanchard,
Dhyne, Fuss, & Mathieu, 2012). In other words, there may be
unobservable factors that affect firm hazard rates and that also
impact on these variables. Demand shocks or a great idea for a new
product are only some of the unobservable factors that may affect
not only firm exit but also firm size and performance. In addition,
the shadow of death phenomenon (e.g., Griliches & Regev, 1995)
may also play a role, as firm productivity or size tend to decline
prior to exit, so these variables may be endogeneous with respect
Table 5
The effect of foreign ownership (share of foreign capital in the firm).a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
For. Ownership 0.4671*** 0.1242** 0.1338** 0.1358** 0.1217
(0.0947) (0.0621) (0.0614) (0.0626) (0.0798)
Age 0.2902 0.3143* 0.3220* 0.3218*
(0.1842) (0.1841) (0.1843) (0.1843)
Age2/100 1.7375* 1.9009* 1.9067* 1.9065*
(1.0076) (1.0072) (1.0081) (1.0081)
Size 0.6136*** 0.6002*** 0.6163*** 0.6162***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Size2 0.0582*** 0.0570*** 0.0582*** 0.0582***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Firm Performance 0.0112** 0.0112** 0.0124** 0.0122**
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Human Capital 0.3210*** 0.2884*** 0.2814*** 0.2845***
(0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0508) (0.0507)
Urban 0.1748*** 0.1400*** 0.1399*** 0.1400***
(0.0110) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0153)
MES 0.0436*** 0.0640*** 0.0640***
(0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0073)
HH Index 6.1368 5.1442 5.0165
(3.8362) (3.9173) (3.9195)
Industry Agglomeration 0.4552 0.7698** 0.7651**
(0.3796) (0.3862) (0.3863)
Regional Agglomeration 0.6015*** 0.6386*** 0.6374***
(0.1602) (0.1650) (0.1650)
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.7578** 0.2064 0.2012
(0.3334) (0.3354) (0.3355)
Industry Openness 0.0404*** 0.0713*** 0.0715***
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Industry Growth 0.2148*** 0.1075** 0.1070**
(0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0419)
Entry Rate 5.1561*** 3.5316*** 3.5213***
(0.3691) (0.3974) (0.3974)
Downturn9194 0.2377*** 0.2356***
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Downturn0103 0.0916*** 0.0929***
(0.0127) (0.0128)
For. Own.*Downturn9194 0.2949**
(0.1485)
For. Own.*Downturn0103 0.1694
(0.1437)
Constant 3.4715*** 1.4196*** 1.4425*** 1.2875*** 1.3179***
(0.0712) (0.1835) (0.1903) (0.1916) (0.1915)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145
Log Likelihood 160,514.94 129,281.64 127,492.04 127,394.48 127,391.07
x2 1035.07*** 10,622.81*** 11,332.53*** 10,996.99*** 11,002.87***
su 2.7656 0.4241 0.3577 0.4505 0.4503
r 0.8230 0.0986 0.0722 0.1098 0.1097
x2(r) 373.58*** 35.59*** 18.76*** 39.00*** 39.00***
To interpret the above results in terms of odds ratios, we must take the exponent of estimated coefficients. r measures the proportion of total unexplained variance that is
contributed by individual specific effects; su corresponds to the standard deviation of the heterogeneity variance; x
2(r) is the Chi-squared test for the significance of
unobserved heterogeneity.
a Complementary log-logistic model with piece-wise constant hazard rates and Inverse Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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to the exit decision. Accordingly, robustness checks taking into
account the potential endogeneity of these regressors must be
performed.
4.2.3. Endogeneity issues and robustness checks
According to the literature, there is neither a standard
Instrumental-Variable (IV) estimation in the context of hazard
models, nor a test of instrument validity under non-linear hazard
estimation (Bandick & Go¨rg, 2010; Bascle, 2008; Wang, 2013).
Consequently, results are reliable under the assumption of
instrument validity, which, so far, cannot be tested in this type
of models. Even so, the use of lagged values of endogeneous
covariates as instruments is a common – and less compromising –
practice (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2012; Girma & Gong, 2008; Haskel,
Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007; Wang, 2013), thus offering a
satisfactory alternative when the suitability of instruments is
not testable.
Concerning the way to introduce IV in non-linear regressions as
discrete time hazard models, this seems to be an issue still under
development, particularly when the potentially endogeneous
regressors are continuous (instead of binary/choice variables).
Prior procedures found in similar literature typically follow one of
the two most common practices: either (1) use the lagged terms of
the endogeneous variables instead of their current values,
assuming that contemporaneous values are affected by their lags,
while these lagged terms do not correlate (or are, at least, much
less correlated) with the error term (e.g., Wang, 2013); or (2) follow
the typical IV methods adopted in linear models, by regressing the
endogeneous variable(s) on a set of exogeneous variables – that
include the exogeneous variables from the main model and
additional instruments (typically, the lagged value(s) of the
endogeneous variable(s)), and then introducing the fitted value
of the endogeneous variable(s) from this first-step regression(s) in
the original model (e.g., Bandick & Go¨rg, 2010; Blanchard et al.,
2012).2
Due to the identified limitations, we analyze the endogeneity of
firm size and performance in an exploratory manner, using the two
aforementioned alternatives. However, unfortunately, when using
IV approach, there seems to be no formal test to choose between
the standard and the IV estimation in the context of survival
models (Wang, 2013). Thus, we provide the results obtained from
IV approach as a robustness test, just to compare with the baseline
results (model 5 from Table 5).3
We report the results from our robustness tests in Table 6. In the
first column we report the results for model 5, after replacing the
variables Size and Firm Performance by their lagged values. This
approach, though simpler, allows attenuating simultaneity bias. In
the second column, we follow the typical IV method and replace
both variables by their fitted value, obtained from the first stage
estimation (whose results are reported in Table A.IV).
Results on most of the firm and industry-level covariates
remain qualitatively unchanged when correcting – or at least
moderating – potential problems caused by endogenous regres-
sors. However, some new results emerge. After taking into account
that firm size and performance are endogeneous and correlated
with the error term, firm-level unobserved heterogeneity is no
longer statistically significant. Also, the U-shaped effect of firm size
on hazards now reaches its inflexion point between 145 (according
to IV estimation) and 152 employees (when using lagged valued
Table 6
Robustness checks to the endogeneity of some regressors.a
1-Year lag IV estimation
For. Ownership 0.0507 0.0918
(0.0848) (0.0886)
Age 0.3232 0.3663*
(0.2027) (0.2080)
Age2/100 1.8601* 2.0917*
(1.0511) (1.0787)
Size (§) 0.4975*** 0.5294***
(0.0134) (0.0162)
Size2 (§) 0.0495*** 0.0532***
(0.0033) (0.0037)
Firm Performance (§) 0.0532*** 0.1032***
(0.0059) (0.0090)
Human Capital 0.4367*** 0.5268***
(0.0580) (0.0606)
Urban 0.1295*** 0.1176***
(0.0160) (0.0166)
MES 0.0693*** 0.0643***
(0.0088) (0.0091)
HH Index 7.5871 7.9842
(4.7295) (4.8240)
Industry Agglomeration 0.0906 0.0800
(0.4336) (0.4475)
Regional Agglomeration 0.6986*** 0.8354***
(0.1774) (0.1822)
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.2414 0.4586
(0.3874) (0.3974)
Industry Openness 0.0704*** 0.0728***
(0.0151) (0.0156)
Industry Growth 0.1849*** 0.1772***
(0.0480) (0.0494)
Entry Rate 3.9121*** 4.1918***
(0.4677) (0.4793)
Downturn9194 0.1631*** 0.1427***
(0.0228) (0.0236)
Downturn0103 0.1866*** 0.1845***
(0.0143) (0.0147)
For. Own*Downturn9194 0.4810*** 0.4800***
(0.1644) (0.1700)
For. Own*Downturn0103 0.1993 0.1267
(0.1596) (0.1621)
Constant 1.4890*** 1.0296***
(0.3747) (0.3916)
Industry Dummies YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES
N 284,049 284,049
Log Likelihood 99,136.40 94,970.37
x2 7531.14 7157.55
su 0.0824 0.1084
r 0.0041 0.0071
x2(r) 0.01 0.12
Hausman test (p-value) – 0.000
a We extend model 5 of Table 5 to attenuate the simultaneity bias caused by
some potential endogeneous regressors – explanatory variables with ‘‘(§)’’ in this
table. In the first column, we replace each of the covariates with ‘‘(§)’’ by their
lagged value (1-year lag). In the second column, we use instrumental variables
estimation and replace those variables by the fitted value of each variable obtained
from the first step equations. The results of the first stage are presented in Table
A.IV.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
2 A less conventional approach is also explored by Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas
(2007) and Blanchard et al. (2012). They include the residual from the first step
estimation in the original model and test the significance of the coefficient of that
residual. If the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant, this may be a
sign of significant endogeneity problems, confirming that the endogeneous
variables should be instrumented. We have also followed this exploratory
approach, which confirmed that this was the case for both variables under analysis
– firm size and firm performance. The results from those additional estimations are
available upon request from the authors.
3 Bandick and Go¨rg (2010) also recognize that, hitherto, there is no formal
method to choose between the two models. Even so, they suggest that the results
from a standard Hausman test would be a rough indicator of whether or not the
assumption of exogeneity holds. We follow their approach and compare the
baseline model (model 5) with the results from IV estimation (column 2 in Table 6).
The test, reported at the bottom of Table 6, suggests that the exogeneity assumption
can be rejected. In addition, the log-likelihood is higher in IV estimation. Overall, the
results suggest that IV estimation results might be preferable to the baseline results.
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for the endogeneous variables), a much lower threshold than those
indicated by the baseline results (about 200 employees). For the
remaining variables, the correction of endogeneity did not
substantially change the conclusions, though the magnitude of
some effects slightly changes. The previous conclusions on the
effect of foreign ownership during crises – which are the main
focus of the study – remain qualitatively the same after controlling
for the endogeneity of firm size and firm performance.4
Despite this analysis is still exploratory, it shows that ignoring the
endogeneity of some firm-level variables may produce biased
estimations. However, most of the literature addressing issues
related with firm survival has been overlooking that some of the
firm-level characteristics predicting exit are in fact endogeneous and
jointly determined with exit decision. In view of that, further
research is needed, not only regarding the effect of some
(endogeneous) variables on firm survival, and moreover regarding
the way to deal with such endogeneous covariates in duration
models.
5. Conclusion
By using a unique data set with firm- and industry-level
information for Portugal, this paper examines the link between
foreign ownership and firm exit in Portuguese manufacturing
industry over an 18-year period and during two periods of
economic slowdown in particular. We investigated two main
questions: if foreign affiliates have different failure rates than
domestic firms during economic downturns and if the foreignness
effect differs between two different economic downturns.
First, the results highlight the importance of taking firm-level
heterogeneity into account when analyzing the survival patterns of
firms. Unconditionally, foreign firms survive longer than their
domestic counterparts. However, when controlling for other
variables, the share of capital held by foreign investors is found
to increase firms’ hazard rates. During the downturn periods
observed in the Portuguese economy, both groups of firms were
severely affected, suffering higher risks of failure. Nevertheless,
while in the first crisis foreign firms were markedly more affected,
partially supporting the footloose argument (Hypothesis 1), in the
second downturn period, the overall differences in hazard rates
between domestic and foreign firms were attenuated, partially
supporting Hypothesis 2.
This is the first study that systematically evaluates the foreign
ownership effect upon exit during such a long time period and
covering two different economic downturns. Further studies are
needed also in other economies. A careful investigation of the
causes behind the observed differences – taking into account, for
instance, the type of FDI and MNEs’ motivations – seems to be in
order for a deepening of our understanding on the prospects of
survival in international markets during crisis.
For the policy-maker concerned with FDI, our results on
survival dynamics are not against policies stimulating inward
investment. According to our results, there is no need to fear that
foreign firms destabilize more than usual the host economy during
economic slowdowns by immediately closing down operations.
Appendix
Table A.I
Description of variables.
Variables Description
Main variables of interest
For. Ownership Share of capital held by foreign investors in time t.
FF_Minority Dummy = 1 if 10%  share of capital held in t by foreign investors < 50%; 0 otherwise.
FF_Majority Dummy = 1 if 50%  share of capital held in t by foreign investors < 100%; 0 otherwise.
FF_Wholly Owned Dummy = 1 if 100% of the capital is held in t by foreign investors; 0 otherwise.
Downturn9194 Dummy = 1 for the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994; 0 otherwise.
Downturn0103 Dummy = 1 for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003; 0 otherwise.
For. Own*Downturni Interaction term between foreign ownership and the dummy for the downturn i (i = 1991–1994; 2001–2003).
FF_Minority*Downturni Interaction term between FF_Minority dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
FF_Majority*Downturni Interaction term between FF_Majority dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
FF_Wholly Owned *Downturni Interaction term between FF_Wholly Owned dummy and the dummy for the downturn i.
Firm-level controls
Age Number of years since the entry of the firm.
Age2/100 Squared number of years since the entry of the firm, divided by 100.
Size Ln(number of employees), by year.
Size2 Squared value of Ln(number of employees), by year.
Firm Performance Operational Performance measured through the log of the ratio Firm Salesa/Firm Employment, by year.
Human Capital Share of workers with a college degree, by year.
Urban Dummy = 1 if the firm operates in large urban areas (i.e., in the districts of Porto or Lisbon); 0 otherwise.
Environment controls (industry and regional context)
MES Median of 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
HH Index Herfindahl–Hirschman Index – sum of the squared share of each firm in total 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
Industry Agglomeration Share of 2-digit industry’s employment in total Manufacturing employment, by year.
Regional Agglomeration Share of regional employment (NUT3) in total employment in the country, by year.
Foreign Presence in Industry Share of FF’s employment in total 2-digit industry’s employment, by year.
Industry Opennessb Ratio 2-digit industry (Exports + Imports)/2-digit industry Gross Value Added, by year.
Industry Growth Ln(2-digit industry Employmentt)  Ln(2-digit industry Employmentt1)
Entry Rate Ratio (Entrants’ employment in year t/2-digit industry total employment in year t)
Industry Dummies Dummy = 1 for each 2-digit industry where the firm operates; 0 otherwise.
a Firm sales in real terms (2005 constant prices).
b Data at 2-digit industry level (ISIC rev. 2) on exports and imports come from Statistics Portugal; Gross Value Added at the industry-level was obtained from Bank of
Portugal.
4 Additional estimations using two year lags for both endogeneous variables
were also performed, though producing qualitatively similar results.
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Table A.II
Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Age (1)
Size (2) 0.21
Firm Performance (3) 0.15 0.02
Human Capital (4) 0.01 0.04 0.17
Foreign Ownership (5) 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.12
Urban (6) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02
MES (7) 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.05
HH Index (8) 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01
Industry Agglomeration (9) 0.05 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.60 0.34
Regional Agglomeration (10) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.68 0.17 0.04 0.17
Industry Openness (11) 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.38 0.01
Industry Growth (12) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.08
For. Presence in Industry (13) 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.31 0.07 0.68 0.01
Entry Rate (14) 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.21
Table A.III
The effect of foreign ownership (indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-Owned FF).a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
FF_Minority 0.4496** 0.1392 0.1537 0.1604 0.0390
(0.2091) (0.1420) (0.1403) (0.1428) (0.2025)
FF_Majority 0.3468*** 0.1638* 0.1754* 0.1770* 0.0882
(0.1311) (0.0905) (0.0897) (0.0914) (0.1249)
FF_WhollyOwned 0.4427*** 0.0849 0.0942 0.0957 0.1165
(0.1020) (0.0713) (0.0704) (0.0717) (0.0900)
Downturn9194 0.2377*** 0.2348***
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Downturn0103 0.0917*** 0.0924***
(0.0127) (0.0128)
FF_Minority*Downturn9194 0.5352
(0.3572)
FF_Majority*Downturn9194 0.4535**
(0.1966)
FF_Wholly Own*Downturn9194 0.0982
(0.1876)
FF_Minority*Downturn0103 0.3458
(0.3170)
FF_Majority*Downturn0103 0.2041
(0.2472)
FF_Wholly Own*Downturn0103 0.1450
(0.1614)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Duration Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145 360,145
Log Likelihood 160,540.95 129,280.99 127,491.23 127,393.66 127,387.93
x2 1058.28*** 10,624.49*** 11,334.77*** 10,999.36*** 11,011.17***
su 2.4087 0.4242 0.3577 0.4505 0.4497
r 0.7791 0.0986 0.0722 0.1098 0.1095
x2(r) 317.46*** 35.60*** 18.76*** 38.99*** 38.86***
a Complementary log-logistic model with piece-wise constant hazard rates and Inverse Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity. Models 1–5 correspond to the same
specifications presented in Table 5, but replacing the variable For.Ownership by the several indicator variables for Minority, Majority and Wholly-Owned FF. Accordingly,
Model 1 estimates the effect of foreign ownership, without controlling for any other variables. Model 2 controls for firm-level differences. Model 3 adds industry-level
variables. Model 4 includes the effect of downturns and Model 5 corresponds to the final global specification, including all variables.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
C. Varum et al. / International Business Review 23 (2014) 761–773 771
Author's personal copy
References
Acs, Z., & Armington, C. (2009). New firm survival and human capital. In C. Karlsson, B.
Johansson, & R. Stough (Eds.), Entrepreneurship and dynamics in the knowledge
economy (pp. 125–148). UK: Routledge.
Alfaro, L., & Chen, M. X. (2012). Surviving the global financial crisis: Foreign ownership
and establishment performance. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(3),
30–55.
A´lvarez, R., & Go¨rg, H. (2009). Multinationals and plant exit: Evidence from Chile.
International Review of Economics and Finance, 18(1), 45–51.
Audretsch, D. (1995). Innovation, growth and survival. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 13(4), 441–457.
Audretsch, D., & Acs, Z. (1994). New-firm startups, technology and macroeconomic
fluctuations. Small Business Economics, 6(6), 439–449.
Audretsch, D., & Mahmood, T. (1994). The rate of hazard confronting new firms and
plants in U.S. manufacturing. Review of Industrial Organization, 9(1), 41–56.
Bandick, R. (2010). Multinationals and plant survival. Review of World Economics,
146(4), 609–634.
Bandick, R., & Go¨rg, H. (2010). Foreign acquisition, plant survival, and employment
growth. Canadian Journal of Economics, 1043(2), 547–573.
Bank of Portugal. (2004). Relato´rio do Conselho de Administrac¸a˜o. Relato´rio e Contas.
Bank of Portugal. (2009). A Economia Portuguesa em 2008, Economic Bulletin. Spring,
15(1), 9–97.
Bascle, G. (2008). Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic
management research. Strategic Organization, 6(3), 285–327.
Bates, T. (1990). Entrepreneur human capital inputs and small business longevity.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 62(4), 551–559.
Behrman, J., & Deolalikar, A. (1989). . . .Of the fittest? Duration of survival of
manufacturing establishments in a developing country. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 38(2), 215–226.
Belderbos, R., & Zou, J. (2007). On the growth of foreign affiliates: Multinational plant
networks, joint ventures, and flexibility. Journal of International Business Studies, 38,
1095–1112 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400319.
Belderbos, R., & Zou, J. (2009). Real options and foreign affiliate divestments: A portfolio
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 600–620 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1057/jibs.2008.108.
Bernard, A., & Jensen, B. (2007). Firm structure, multinationals and manufacturing
plant deaths. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 193–204.
Bernard, A., & Sjo¨holm, F. (2003). Foreign owners and plant survival. National Bureau of
Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 10039.
Bhattacharjee, A., Higson, C., Holly, S., & Kattuman, P. (2009). Macroeconomic instabili-
ty and business exit: Determinants of failures and acquisitions of UK firms.
Economica, 76(301), 108–131.
Blalock, G., Gertler, P., & Levine, D. (2005). Investment following a financial crisis: Does
foreign ownership matter? Mimeo Cornell University.
Blanchard, P., Dhyne, E., Fuss, C., & Mathieu, C. (2012). (Not so) easy come, (still) easy go?
Footloose multinationals revisited. National Bank of Belgium, Working Paper No. 223.
Boeri, T., & Bellman, L. (1995). Post-entry behaviour and the cycle: Evidence from
Germany. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(4), 483–500.
Bogach, O., & Noy, I. (2012). Fire-sale FDI? The impact of financial crises on foreign direct
investment. Mimeo, School of Economics and Finance Working Paper No. 10/2012 New
Zealand: Victoria University of Wellington.
Box, M. (2008). The deaths of firms: Exploring the effects of environment and birth
cohort of firm survival in Sweden. Small Business Economics, 31(4), 379–393.
Bridges, S., & Guariglia, A. (2008). Financial constraints, global engagement and firm
survival in the United Kingdom: Evidence from micro data. Scottish Journal of
Political Economy, 55(4), 444–464.
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics – Methods and applications.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campa, J. M. (1993). Entry by foreign firms in the U.S. under exchange rate uncertainty.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(4), 614–622.
Campbell, B. A., Ganco, M., Franco, A. M., & Agarwal, R. (2012). Who leaves, where to and
why worry? Employee mobility, entrepreneurship and effects on source firm
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 33(1), 65–87.
Carreira, C., & Teixeira, P. (2011). The shadow of death: Analyzing the pre-exit
productivity of Portuguese manufacturing firms. Small Business Economics,
36(3), 337–351.
Chung, C., Lu, J., & Beamish, P. (2008). Multinational networks during times of economic
crisis versus stability. Management International Review, 48(3), 279–296.
Desai, M., Foley, C., & Forbes, K. (2004). Financial constraints and growth: Multinational
and local firm responses to currency crises. National Bureau of Economic Research,
NBER Working Paper 10545.
Dunning, J., & Lundan, S. (2008). Multinational enterprises and the global economy (2nd
ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
European Commission. (2005). The new SME definition. User guide and model declaration.
Luxembourg: European Commission Publications, Enterprise and Industry.
Fertala, N. (2008). The shadow of death: Do regional differences matter for firm survival
across native and immigrant entrepreneurs? Empirica, 35(1), 59–80.
Flamm, K. (1984). The volatility of offshore investment. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 16(3), 231–248.
Fotopoulos, G., & Louri, H. (2000). Location and survival of new entry. Small Business
Economics, 14(4), 311–321.
Gao, T., & Eshaghoff, T. (2004). MNCs’ preferred responses to the Argentine financial
crisis: A classification and empirical investigation. Latin American Business Review,
5(1), 23–44.
Geroski, P., Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2010). Founding conditions and the survival of new
firms. Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 510–529.
Ghosal, V. (2010). Quantifying the role played by sunk capital costs in real-options
models. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 57(3), 343–358.
Girma, S., & Gong, Y. (2008). Putting people first? Chinese state-owned enterprises’
adjustment to globalization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(2),
573–585.
Go¨rg, H., & Strobl, E. (2003a). Footloose’ multinationals? The Manchester School, 71(1),
1–19.
Go¨rg, H., & Strobl, E. (2003b). Multinational companies, technology spillovers and plant
survival. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(4), 581–595.
Griliches, Z., & Regev, H. (1995). Productivity and firm turnover in Israeli industry: 1979–
1988. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 4059.
Haskel, J., Pereira, S., & Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Does inward foreign direct investment
boost the productivity of domestic firms? Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3),
482–496.
Holmes, P., Hunt, A., & Stone, I. (2010). An analysis of new firm survival using a hazard
function. Applied Economics, 42(2), 185–195.
Hosmer, D., Lemeshow, S., & May, S. (2008). Applied survival analysis – Regression
modeling of time-to-event data. New Jersey: Wiley-Interscience/John Wiley & Sons
Inc.
Hougaard, P. (1995). Frailty models for survival data. Lifetime Data Analysis, 1(3),
255–273.
Table A.IV
First stage estimations for the endogeneous explanatory variables.
Firm Size Firm Performance
For. Ownership 0.1947*** 0.3416***
(0.0078) (0.0166)
Age 0.0042*** 0.0108***
(0.0007) (0.0011)
Size 0.0016
(0.0013)
Sizet1 0.9620
***
(0.0007)
Firm Performance 0.0812***
(0.0011)
Firm Performancet1 0.6750
***
(0.0029)
Human Capital 0.0321** 0.6224***
(0.0134) (0.0207)
Urban 0.0167*** 0.0310***
(0.0019) (0.0034)
MES 0.0122*** 0.0025
(0.0011) (0.0023)
HH Index 2.0271*** 0.4241
(0.5200) (1.1171)
Industry Agglomeration 0.5884*** 0.5106***
(0.0530) (0.1017)
Regional Agglomeration 0.1278*** 0.1713***
(0.0202) (0.0377)
Foreign Presence in Industry 0.3922*** 0.1650**
(0.0418) (0.0789)
Industry Openness 0.0004 0.0270***
(0.0018) (0.0036)
Industry Growth 0.0089* 0.0713***
(0.0048) (0.0113)
Entry Rate 0.3113*** 0.1403
(0.0552) (0.1083)
Downturn9194 0.0365*** 0.0267***
(0.0029) (0.0061)
Downturn0103 0.0147*** 0.0167***
(0.0016) (0.0029)
Constant 0.8472*** 3.6346***
(0.0135) (0.0344)
Industry Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
N 313,984 284,049
F-Statistic 74,178.05 4192.07
R2 0.9052 0.5865
Values in parenthesis correspond to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The
number of observations in the second equation is lower due to some missing values
for firm sales, needed to compute our measure of firm performance.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
C. Varum et al. / International Business Review 23 (2014) 761–773772
Author's personal copy
Hymer, S. (1976). The international operations of national firms: A study on direct foreign
investment. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hyytinen, A., & Ilmakunnas, P. (2007). What distinguishes a serial entrepreneur?
Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(5), 793–821.
Ilmakunnas, P., & Topi, J. (1999). Microeconomic and macroeconomic influences on
entry and exits of firms. Review of Industrial Organization, 15(3), 283–301.
Jenkins, S. (2005). Survival analysis. Institute for Social and Economic Research, Uni-
versity of Essex. (unpublished Lecture Notes manuscript). Available at http://
www.iser.essex.ac.uk/resources/survival-analysis-with-stata-module-ec968.
Jovanovic,B. (1982). Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica, 50(3), 649–670.
Kalbfleisch, J., & Prentice, R. (1980). The statistical analysis of failure data. New York:
Wiley.
Kimura, F., & Kiyota, K. (2006). Exports, FDI and productivity: Dynamic evidence from
Japanese firms. Review of World Economics, 142(4), 695–719.
Kimura, F., & Kiyota, K. (2007). Foreign-owned versus domestically-owned firms:
Economic performance in Japan. Review of Development Economics, 11(1), 31–48.
Kronborg, D., & Thomsen, S. (2009). Foreign ownership and long-term survival.
Strategic Management Journal, 30(2), 207–219.
Lee, S., & Makhija, M. (2009). Flexibility in internationalization: Is it valuable during an
economic crisis? Strategic Management Journal, 30(5), 537–555.
Lehmann, A. (2002). The distribution of fixed capital in the multinational firm. IMF Staff
Papers, 49(1), 136–153.
Li, J., & Guisinger, S. (1991). Comparative business failures of foreign-controlled firms in
the United States. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(2), 209–224.
Li, J., & Rugman, A. M. (2007). Real options and the theory of foreign direct investment.
International Business Review, 16(6), 687–712.
Lipsey, R. (2001). Foreign investment in three financial crisis. National Bureau of Economic
Research, NBER Working Papers 8084.
Manjo´n-Antolı´n, M. C., & Arauzo-Carod, J. (2008). Firm survival: Methods and evidence.
Empirica, 35(1), 1–24.
Mata, J., & Freitas, E. (2012). Foreignness and exit over the life cycle of firms. Journal of
International Business Studies, 43, 615–630.
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2002). The survival of new domestic and foreign-owned firms.
Strategic Management Journal, 23(4), 323–562.
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2004). Patterns of entry, post-entry growth and survival. Small
Business Economics, 22(3/4), 283–298.
Narjoko, D., & Hill, H. (2007). Winners and losers during a deep economic crisis: Firm-
level evidence from Indonesian manufacturing. Asian Economic Journal, 21(4), 343–
368.
O¨zler, S., & Taymaz, E. (2004). Does foreign ownership matter for survival and growth?
Dynamics of competition and foreign direct investment. Economic Research Center,
Working Paper 04/06.
Singer, J., & Willett, J. (1993). It’s about time: Using discrete-time survival analysis to
study duration and the timing of events. Journal of Educational Statistics, 18(2),
155–195.
Stinchcombe, F. (1965). Social structure and organizations. In J. March (Ed.), Handbook
of organizations (pp. 142–193). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Taymaz, E., & O¨zler, S. (2007). Foreign ownership, competition and survival dynamics.
Review of Industrial Organization, 31(1), 23–42.
Teixeira, A., & Vieira, P. (2005). Capital humano, faleˆncias empresariais e produtividade.
Uma ana´lise empı´rica das regio˜es Portuguesas. Estudos Regionais, 7, 5–18.
Van Beveren, I. (2007). Footloose multinationals in Belgium? Review of World Econom-
ics, 143(3), 483–507.
Varum, C., & Rocha, V. C. (2011). Do foreign and domestic firms behave any different
during economic slowdowns? International Business Review, 20(1), 48–59.
Varum, C., & Rocha, V. C. (2012). The effect of crises on firm exit and the moderating
effect of firm size. Economics Letters, 114(1), 94–97.
Wang, Y. (2013). Exposure to FDI and new plant survival: Evidence in Canada. Canadian
Journal of Economics, 46(1), 46–77.
Yeaple, S. R. (2003). The complex integration strategies of multinationals and cross
country dependencies in the structure of foreign direct investment. Journal of
International Economics, 60(2), 293–314.
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the liability of foreignness. The Academy of Management
Journal, 38(2), 341–363.
Zaheer, S., & Mosakowski, E. (1997). The dynamics of the liability of foreignness: A
global study of survival in financial services. Strategic Management Journal, 18(6),
439–464.
C. Varum et al. / International Business Review 23 (2014) 761–773 773
